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1. Introduction  
As shown in this paper, as well as in many other studies, earnings inequality in urban 
China has been continuously increasing under China’s economic reform. However, real earnings 
increased in all groups, including the lowest-income group (See Figure 1). Considering these 
findings, the question can be asked: Is the rise in earnings inequality problematic? Indeed, the 
rise may be problematic if it hinders China’s economic efficiency by creating labor market 
segmentation, and if it systematically generates unequal earnings opportunities. Too large an 
inequality in earnings may also lead to social unrest. However, at the same time, growth in 
earnings inequality can be considered evidence of an improvement in economic efficiency in 
China as its market mechanism is still developing. In order to evaluate whether the rise in 
earnings inequality is “good” or “bad” for the economic development of China, or which parts 
are “good” and which parts are “bad,” it is necessary to carefully examine the factors that have 
contributed to the inequality and to what degree. Only after such a careful assessment can an 
appropriate policy prescription for earnings inequality in China be possible. 
Along with China’s economic reform and transformation from egalitarian planned 
socialism to “market socialism,” earnings distribution and earnings inequality in China became 
an interesting and important issue for both Chinese and international researchers, and Chinese 
policy makers. Such increased attention to earnings distribution in China led to a large 
international research project called the “Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP),” which 
was conducted in 1988, 1995, and 2002. As described in a later section, CHIP is the most 
comprehensive income survey in China, covering nationwide households with various kinds of 
income sources and various household attributes and members. By using the CHIP data 
(sometimes supplemented by other official Chinese national surveys), comprehensive studies 
have been carried out on earnings distribution and its inequality in China at the household and 
individual level (Griffin & Zhao, 1993; Khan & Riskin, 2001; Riskin, Zhao, & Li, 2001; Knight 
& Song, 2005; Gustaffson, Li, & Sicular, 2008).  
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By using province-level or sub-province-level data, regional inequality in China has 
also been examined by many researchers (For example, for recent studies, see Kanbur & Zhang, 
2005; Wan, Lu, & Chen, 2007; Tsui, 2007). However, as Okushima and Uchimura (2006) claim, 
major studies on earnings inequality in China have focused more on rural or regional (e.g. 
rural-urban) inequality issues than on urban inequality issues.  
This paper therefore aims to analyze the causes of earnings inequality in urban China 
from 1988 to 2002 by examining individual samples of urban Chinese residents drawn from the 
1988, 1995, and 2002 CHIP data. I examine the degree to which institutional factors (i.e. labor 
market segmentation by province, employment status, industry, and ownership, and labor 
market discrimination by sex, minority status, and Communist Party membership) and human 
capital factors (i.e. education, experience, and occupation) contributed to the earnings inequality 
(both the level and its increase) in urban China from 1988 to 2002. Knight and Song (2005) and 
Okushima and Uchimura (2006) have previously analyzed the causes of earnings inequality in 
urban China in 1988 and 1995 by using the regression-based inequality method, which I have 
also applied to my analysis. However, by examining the 2002 data, this paper reveals how the 
causes of earnings inequality changed between the two periods 1988-1995 and 1995-2002 by 
reflecting labor-related institutional reform in China.1 Contrary to the situation from 1988 to 
1995, between 1995 and 2002, employment status became the largest disequalizer, and the 
decline of inter-provincial inequality contributed to a reduction in the overall earnings inequality. 
Individual ability, represented by education and occupation, received much greater rewards.  
In addition to analyzing the recent trend to 2002, this paper contributes to the existing 
inequality decomposition literature on urban China in the following aspects: First, this paper 
measures earnings inequality in terms of the purchasing power of workers by adjusting price 
differences across provinces. By adjusting regional price differences (RPD), I show that in the 
                                                  
1 After completing my analysis, I found Knight and Song (2008) who extended their previous inequality 
decomposition analysis to the year 2002. However, my analysis still differs from their study in terms of 1) 
adjusting for regional price differences, 2) examining employment status as a cause of inequality, 3) 
decomposing the inequality increase further into price and quantity effects. 
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existing literature, the level of earnings inequality in urban China and the contribution of the 
province to it have been overstated, while the contribution of other factors have been 
understated. Second, this paper analyzes the causes of earnings inequality in urban China in 
more detail, by examining the degree to which the contribution of each factor to the inequality 
change was due to price change (changes in the valuation of each individual's attributes) and 
quantity change (changes in the composition of individual attributes). It turns out that for both 
periods, 1988-1995 and 1995-2002, 75-90 percent of the explained inequality increase was due 
to price change and not due to quantity change. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data I use in my analysis. 
Section 3 describes the empirical strategy, including inequality measures used, and inequality 
decomposition method. Section 4 first describes to what extent, in the existing literature, 
regional price differences (RPD) have inflated the overall earnings inequality level in urban 
China as well as the contribution of the province to the inequality. Second, it decomposes the 
RPD-adjusted earnings into various institutional and human capital factors. It also decomposes 
the contribution of each factor to rising inequality into price effect and quantity effect. Section 5 
shows that the changes in the causes of earnings inequality in urban China in the periods 
1988-1995 and 1995-2002 primarily reflected the labor-related institutional reforms which 
occurred during those periods. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the findings of this paper. 
Additionally, the areas for future research are discussed. 
 
2. Data Description 
2.1 Data  
My analysis uses individual samples of urban Chinese residents drawn from the survey 
named the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) or CASS survey for 1988, 1995, and 
2002 (Griffin & Zhao, 1993; Riskin, Zhao, & Li, 2000; RCIDP).2 CHIP is conducted by an 
                                                  
2 I acknowledge the Research Center for Income Distribution and Poverty (RCIDP), Beijing Normal 
University (BNU), and the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) which 
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international group of economists with the Economics Institute of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS) in order “to estimate the household income and its distribution in China 
according to standard international definitions” (Khan & Riskin, 1998). According to Khan and 
Riskin (2005), the CHIP surveys “still remain the only available source of (almost) nation-wide 
household-level data on income and other individual and household characteristics in China” 
and “provide the only comprehensive data base for the application of an income definition that 
helps overcome the limitations of the official definition underlying the published income data in 
China.” Detailed information about CHIP and an overview of China’s household income and its 
distribution in each survey can be found in Khan, Griffin, Riskin, and Zhao (1992), Khan and 
Riskin (1998), and Khan and Riskin (2005).  
I used only urban individual samples drawn from all three CHIP datasets. My sample 
includes only working or employed individuals who are age 16 or above, are reporting positive 
earnings, and are living in the urban areas of ten provinces, namely, Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, 
Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Guangdong, Yunnan, and Gansu. These provinces were selected 
in the CHIP survey to represent the entire urban Chinese population.3 My sample largely 
excludes rural-urban migrants who have rural registration (hukou) but are living in urban areas.4 
Earnings are defined as an annual wage including bonuses and subsidies from the 
primary work unit. When constructing the earnings based on this definition, I followed the 
income definition of the CHIP survey and used “UY1: Wage and salary: Cash income of the 
working members or wage” and subtracted income from the second job from UY1. When some 
earnings components were missing, I first dropped observations if the regular wage (in 1988) or 
                                                                                                                                                  
distribute the CHIP datasets and who allowed me to use the datasets for my analysis. 
3 “Liaoning and Shanxi provinces were chosen to represent the north. Jiangsu and Guangdong represent 
the eastern coastal provinces, while Anhui, Henan and Hubei the interior and Gansu and Yunnan represent 
the west. Beijing represents the three large province-level municipalities.” (Eichen & Ming, 1993). 
4 Only in the 2002 CHIP questionnaire, there is a question about hukou status. The result reveals that 
some urban residents actually have rural hukou. According to Appleton and Song (2008), they were 
included “because of their purchase of urban temporary status”. In fact, my CHIP 2002 sample includes 
83 workers having rural hukou. However, the proportion of them is very small (1.0%) and does not affect 
the essence of this paper. Using the sample excluding those rural-hukou workers does not change the 
inequality indices and regression-based decomposition results largely.  
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wage including bonuses and subsidies (in 1995 and 2002) was missing, then replaced missing 
values of other related income components with zero, and constructed a “UY1 minus second job 
income.”5 After that, individuals who earned non-positive earnings were also dropped. All the 
annual earnings are first adjusted in 1988 yuan prices by using the Urban General Price Index, 
which is identical for all provinces. I also adjusted the earnings by the 1988 Beijing price, 
taking into consideration the regional price (or living cost) differences. (For more detail, see 
Sections 3 and 4.) In the decomposition analysis, all earnings are expressed in logarithmic form 
following the form of the common earnings equation. 
In the 1988 CHIP survey, there are questions about educational level, but no questions 
about years of schooling and experience. I have thus substituted the estimated years of 
schooling used in Knight and Li (1993, p.291) for each educational level category, and 
estimated years of experience as [age-years of schooling-6]. I have also estimated years of 
experience similarly for the 1995 or 2002 CHIP data, if the corresponding data were missing. 
After all observations in which there are missing values for variables used in the analysis were 
dropped, the final sample size becomes 17,085 for 1988, 9,477 for 1995, and 8,077 for 2002.  
 
2.2 Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics (number of observations, proportion of each 
category, and mean of annual earnings expressed in 1988 urban yuan prices and RPD-adjusted 
1988 Beijing yuan prices) of variables used in the decomposition analysis.  
They reveal some remarkable compositional changes between 1988 and 2002, such as: 
1) a significant proportional increase in highly-educated workers, 2) a proportional decline in 
                                                  
5 An alternative treatment for the missing values of income components other than regular wage would 
be to replace them with some average income such as the county or provincial average income. However, 
since about 60-90 % of the many related income components were missing in the 1988 and 1995 samples, 
replacing them with some average income may also create as many errors as simply replacing them with 
zero. The choice of average income (e.g. average income of province, educational group, occupation, and 
so on) may be arbitrary and problematic because it arbitrarily changes the contribution of a certain factor 
in the inequality decomposition. Thus, I have chosen to replace the missing values of income components 
other than the regular wage with zero. 
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state-owned and collective units and an increase in private or individual enterprises and 
self-employed workers, 3) a decline in the manufacturing industry especially from 1995 to 2002, 
and 4) a decline in permanent or long-term contract workers and an increase in temporary or 
short-term contract workers, private enterprise proprietors or self-employed workers, and 
workers who are employed without contract. For each variable, a more detailed examination is 
presented below. 
Sex: The proportion of males is always greater than females and the proportion of males 
increased from 1988 to 2002. Males consistently received higher earnings than females. 
Minority status and Communist Party membership: In all periods, about 5% report 
being of minority ethnic origin. The proportion of workers who are members of the Communist 
Party (CP) was about 25% in 1988 and 1995, while it was 30% in 2002. CP members 
consistently receive higher earnings than non-members. 
Age and experience: Age and experience are not reported in Table 1. The mean age rose 
from 1988 to 2002. It was 37.1 years in 1988, 38.4 in 1995, and 40.5 in 2002. Estimated mean 
years of experience were 20.3 years in 1988, 19.3 in 1995, and 20.4 in 2002. 
Educational level: From 1988 to?2002, the educational level of the sample became 
substantially higher. The proportion of workers with a college education or above (edu1) 
increased from 6.3% in 1988 to 10.9% in 2002. So did workers with professional school 
education (edu2), which rose from 6.8% to 24.0%, and those with middle level professional, 
technical or vocational, and upper middle school education (edu3) rose from 36.2% to 41.2%. In 
contrast, the proportion of workers with a lower level of education declined. The proportion of 
lower middle school graduates (edu4) decreased from 38.7% in 1988 to 21.7% in 2002. The 
proportion of workers with an elementary school and lower educational level (edu5) decreased 
from 12.0% to 2.2%. The earnings gap among education groups continuously increased. 
Occupation: The proportion of professional or technical workers (occ2) increased most 
notably between 1988 and 1995 (from 16.1% to 22.1%). In contrast, the proportion of laborers 
and others (occ5) including salesclerks or service workers (which are mentioned as a separate 
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category in the CHIP 2002 questionnaire) declined, especially between 1988 and 1995 (from 
52.9% to 43.8%).  
Industry: The proportion of manufacturing (ind2) decreased dramatically between 1995 
and 2002 from 41.1% to 25.2%. The proportion of commerce and restaurants, etc. (ind6) also 
decreased from 14.4% in 1995 to 10.2% in 2002. These two industries received relatively low 
earnings in all three years. In contrast, the proportion of real estate, public utilities, personal, 
consulting, and social services (ind7) increased greatly from 3.9% in 1995 to 14.2% in 2002. 
The proportion of health, physical culture, and social welfare (ind8), education, culture, and arts 
(ind9), finance and insurance (ind11), government, Party, and social organizations (ind12) 
increased slightly.  
Ownership: The proportion of state-owned and local publicly-owned units (own1), and 
urban collectives (own2) declined significantly from 1988 to 2002 (own1: from 79.1% in 1988 
to 66.6% in 2002, and own2: from 20.1% to 7.5 %), although the proportional increase in own1 
in 1995 seems anomalous.6 In contrast, the proportion of private or individual enterprises, and 
self-employed (own2) increased significantly, especially between 1995 and 2002 (0.4% in 1995 
to 9.5% in 2002). The proportion of Sino-foreign joint ventures (own4) and foreign-owned 
firms (own5) increased slightly. Other ownership (own6) includes township and village 
enterprises, share-holding companies, and so on. Individuals working in foreign-owned firms 
earned a much higher salary in 1995 and 2002, although the sample size is small and may not be 
representative of the entire population of urban Chinese workers employed by foreign-owned 
units (most notably in 1995).  
Employment status: The composition of employment status in urban China changed 
dramatically from 1988 to 2002, particularly between 1995 and 2002; the proportion of 
                                                  
6 The 2002 CHIP questionnaire first asked about the types of current work unit (enterprise, government 
agency, institution, or others) and then asked about the ownership of the work unit only if the respondent 
was working in an enterprise. Since about 2,700 people responded as working in government agency or 
institution, I merged them with the own1 category. This treatment may not be accurate, but is reasonable 
since 96.5% of people working in government agencies or institutions answered that the ownership of 
their work unit is own1 in the 1995 CHIP. 
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permanent and long-term contract workers declined during this time period. In 1988, almost all 
workers (98.2%) were working as permanent or long-term contract workers (emp1). In 1995, 
96.5% of the workers remained in that category. However, in 2002, only 76.9% of workers had 
the emp1 status, and the proportion of temporary and short-term contract workers (emp2) 
increased greatly from 2.5% in 1995 to 11.2% in 2002. The proportion of private enterprise 
proprietors or self-employed (emp3) and other statuses (emp4, who were mainly workers 
employed without contract in 2002) also increased. This change seems to reflect institutional 
changes that have occurred in China’s urban labor market since the mid-1990s, as I will mention 
in Section 5. The earnings gap between emp1 and other employment status categories also 
expanded between 1995 and 2002. 
Province: In my CHIP sample, the Beijing proportion increased from 4.9% in 1988, to 
7.7% in 1995, and to 9.8% in 2002. Compared with the provincial composition of China’s total 
urban employment drawn from the China Labour Statistical Yearbook, my sample seems to 
overrepresent some inland provinces such as Yunnan, Shanxi, and Gansu, while it 
underrepresents coastal provinces such as Guangdong and Liaoning. This is due not to the 
sample selection method mentioned in the previous section, but to the provincial composition of 
the original CHIP sample. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy: Measuring and Decomposing Inequality  
3.1 Inequality measures used in this analysis 
 Judging to what degree earnings inequality exists depends on what inequality measure 
we use. This analysis focuses on relative inequality, not absolute inequality. Relative inequality 
measures satisfy the income homogeneity, or scale independence property, which considers that 
the level of inequality does not change when everyone’s income is multiplied by the same 
number. In contrast, absolute inequality measures observe that inequality has increased in such 
situations because the income gap between the rich and the poor has enlarged in terms of 
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absolute currency values. As Fields (2001) states, since it is empirically known that absolute 
inequality almost always increases during economic growth, it is more interesting to examine 
changes in relative earnings inequality in urban China, which experienced rapid economic 
growth from 1988 to 2002. Analyzing relative inequality is also more common in inequality 
literature (Fields, 2001, p.16).  
Among the various relative inequality measures, the Gini coefficient, the Theil entropy 
measure, the ratio of 90th to 10th percentile (90/10 ratio), and similarly 50/10, 90/50, 75/25, and 
95/5 ratios, and log-variance (the variance of the logarithms of earnings) are used in most of the 
analyses in this paper. Among those measures, I primarily examine the Gini coefficient and 
sometimes examine log-variance and the 90/10 ratio. The Gini coefficient and Theil entropy 
measure are both strongly Lorenz-consistent, although the Gini coefficient is more commonly 
used in the literature. Despite the fact that log-variance is Lorenz-inconsistent and is somewhat 
problematical, as Foster and Ok (1999) state, I use log-variance in order to decompose 
inequality into price and quantity effects.7 Since, as we will see later, the contributions of some 
factors to inequality changes tend to be much greater than 100% in the Gini coefficient, but not 
in the log-variance, using log-variance sometimes makes it easier to see the overall features of 
the decomposition results. 90/10 ratio and other percentile ratio measures are weakly 
Lorenz-consistent. Among them, the 90/10 ratio is most commonly used in inequality analysis 
and can be a good alternative inequality measure for the Gini coefficient. (For the 
Lorenz-consistency of inequality measures, see Fields, 2001, pp.30-33. For more details on 
inequality measures, see Chapter 2 of Fields, 2001.)  
 
3.2 Calculating RPD’s contribution to unadjusted earnings inequality 
I argue that earnings inequality should be measured in terms of worker purchasing 
                                                  
7 Log-variance is Lorenz-inconsistent because it does not satisfy the transfer principle, and thus “certain 
transfers from someone relatively rich to someone relatively poor may increase the log-variance” (Fields, 
2001, p.31). Foster and Ok (1999) showed that in the “worst-case scenario” it is possible that the 
log-variance concludes that the extreme inequality represented by an almost L-shaped Lorenz curve is 
more equal than the extreme equality represented by a Lorenz curve that is almost on the o45 line. 
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power and reflect the cost of living in each region. In Section 4, I will show the extent to which, 
in the existing literature, regional price differences (RPD) have inflated the overall earnings 
inequality level in urban China as well as the contribution of the province to the inequality. For 
such an examination, individual annual earnings are adjusted for regional price differences 
(RPD) by using the spatial price deflators developed by Brandt and Holz (2004). Their deflators 
were computed by constructing provincial-level living expenditure baskets in order to adjust the 
provincial purchasing power differences over time. In my analysis, RPD adjustment was carried 
out based on the 1988 Beijing price level. Unadjusted earnings were adjusted by the General 
Price Index of Urban Areas, as in the existing literature, and they are based on the 1988 price 
level.  
The contribution of RPD to the unadjusted earnings level and its change is then 
calculated by the following equation. 
(%)100*)](.)/(.)(1[ noRPDRPD IIRPDeffect −=  
where RPDeffect : RPD’s contribution to unadjusted earnings inequality level or its change, 
            RPDI (.) : Inequality index (for inequality level or inequality change) computed 
based on RPD-adjusted earnings, and  
            noRPDI (.) : Inequality index (for inequality level or inequality change) computed 
based on unadjusted earnings. 
 
3.3 Decomposing earning inequality: Regression-based approach 
In order to decompose the level and its change in earnings inequality in urban China 
from 1988 to 2002, I applied the regression-based decomposition method, which is proposed 
and comprehensively explained in Fields (2002). As Fields states, this regression-based 
decomposition method has some advantages. It is compatible with the regression analysis by 
running a standard semi-log income-generating function. Also, in the level decomposition, the 
magnitude of each factor’s contribution does not change regardless of the inequality measure 
used. 
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Following Fields (2002), I first ran an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression by fitting 
a standard semi-log earnings-generating function separately for each year (1988, 1995, and 
2002). In order to compare the results, two dependent variables were used: one is RPD-adjusted 
log earnings and the other is unadjusted log earnings. The explanatory variables used in all 
equations are sex (sex), minority status (min), Communist Party membership (cp), years of 
experience and years of experience squared (exp), educational level (edu), occupation (occ), 
ownership (own), industry (ind), employment status (emp), and province (prov).8 Following the 
classification of Knight and Song (2005), sex, minority status, and Communist Party 
membership are considered to be “discrimination” variables which indicate the existence of 
discrimination in the labor market. Ownership, industry, employment status, and province are 
considered to be labor market “segmentation” variables. 9  I classify both discrimination 
variables and labor market segmentation variables as institutional factors. Education, experience 
and occupation are classified as human capital factors. 
The regression equation can be simply expressed as follows.  
tijtj jttit
ZY εβα ++= ∑ln  
where subscripts i and t indicate individual and time period (1988, 1995, or 2002), respectively. 
itYln  is the logarithm of earnings, tα is the estimated constant term, ijtZ is the j’th 
explanatory variable, jtβ is the estimated coefficient for the j’th explanatory variable, and tε is 
the residual.  
 The above equation can be rewritten as  
 ittit ZaY 'ln =  
where ta = [ tα t1β t2β … Jtβ  1] represents the estimated coefficient vectors, and  
      itZ = [1 tix 1 tix 2 … iJtx  itε ]?represents the constant, J explanatory variables, and the 
residual. 
                                                  
8 The number of categories in each variable is 2 (sex), 2 (min), 2 (cp), 5 (edu), 5 (occ), 6 (own), 13 (ind), 
4 (emp), and 10 (prov). For details, please refer to Table 1. 
9 Knight and Song (2005) did not include industry and employment status as decomposers. As a result, 
they only included ownership and province as “segmentation” variables. 
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)(lnYs j , the contribution of the j’th factor to the inequality level of lnY in a certain 
period (subscript t is omitted) can then be calculated as follows:  
Contribution of the j’th factor to the inequality level of lnY  
 )(ln/]ln,[*)(*)(ln/]ln,cov[)(ln 2 YYZcorZaYYZaYs jjjjjj σσσ ==  
where 2σ , σ , and cor stand for variance, standard error, and correlation, respectively. 
∑+
=
=
2
1
%100)(ln
J
j
j Ys , and ∑+
=
=
1
1
2 )(ln)(ln
J
j
j YRYs , where 
2R stands for R-squared which 
represents the overall percentage explained by the explanatory variables (Fields 2002, Equations 
(8.a-d)). 
Next, the contribution of the j’th factor to the change in an inequality measure I(.), such 
as the Gini coefficient, 90/10 ratio, and log-variance, between time 1 and time 2 can be 
calculated as follows: 
Contribution of the j’th factor to the change in an inequality measure between time 1 and 
time 2 
 ](.)(.)/[](.)*(.)*[(.))( 1211,22, IIIsIsI jjj −−=Π  
where tI (.)  represents an inequality measure calculated at time t (t = 1 or 2), and 
tjs , represents the contribution of the j’th factor to the inequality level of lnY at time t (Fields 
2002, Equation (17.b)). 
 Unlike level decomposition, where the value of )(lnYs j  does not depend on the 
inequality measure used, the value of (.))(IjΠ  does depend on which inequality measure is 
used. 
 
3.4 Decomposing inequality change into price and quantity effects 
 I will also decompose the contribution of each factor to the inequality change into 
price and quantity effects, following the method described by Fields (2002), which also referred 
to the works of Yun (2002) and Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993).  
First, two actual log earnings distributions (in my analysis, actual RPD-adjusted log 
earnings) at time 1 and 2 are expressed as follows, respectively. 
 14
1,11, 'ln ii ZaY = ?(Actual log earnings distribution at time 1) 
2,22, 'ln ii ZaY =  (Actual log earnings distribution at time 2) 
Next, the following auxiliary log earnings distribution, which uses the prices of 
distribution at time 1 and the quantities and residual of distribution at time 2, is generated.   
  2,1, 'ln iauxi ZaY =  
The variance of auxYln  is then expressed as 
  )(ln)ln,()()(ln 221
2
auxauxjjj jaux
YYZcorZaY σσσ ∑=   
(Fields, 2002, Equation (23)) 
The inequality change between time 1 and time 2 can be decomposed as  
)()( 1212 IIIIII auxaux −+−=−  
where the first term represents the price effect and the second term represents the quantity 
effect. 
Using log-variance as the inequality measure I (.), the above equation becomes  
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The weights of price and quantity effects within each j’th factor can then be calculated 
by the following equation, where the first and second term on the right hand side represents the 
price effect and the quantity effect, respectively.                                       
                                                    (Fields, 2002, Equation (26)) 
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4. Results 
4.1 Inequality of RPD-adjusted and unadjusted earnings 
Earnings inequality in urban China continuously increased in terms of both 
RPD-adjusted and unadjusted earnings. Figure 2 and Figure 3 clearly show that a 
Lorenz-worsening occurred in urban China from 1988 to 1995 and from 1995 to 2002 in terms 
of both types of earnings. As shown in Table 2, Lorenz-worsening leads to an increase in all 
Lorenz-consistent inequality indices, such as the Gini coefficient, Theil entropy measure, and 
90/10 ratio (or 50/10, 90/50, 75/25, and 95/5 ratio). Although log-variance is not 
Lorenz-consistent, inequality also increased in terms of log-variance. Table 2 also shows that for 
all indices, the inequality levels based on RPD-adjusted earnings are smaller than those based 
on unadjusted earnings, which have usually been used in analyses in the existing literature. For 
example, the Gini coefficient based on RPD-adjusted earnings is 0.233 (1988), 0.278 (1995), 
and 0.330 (2002) respectively, while it is 0.245 (1988), 0.300 (1995), and 0.348 (2002) based on 
unadjusted earnings. This fact illustrates that RPD has inflated the overall earnings inequality 
level in urban China in the existing literature.  
 
4.2 Contribution of RPD to the inequality of unadjusted earnings 
Table 3 reports on the degree of contributions of RPD to inequality levels based on 
unadjusted earnings and their changes over time. As Table 3 shows, if we measure the inequality 
by the Gini coefficient, RPD accounts for 4.8% of the inequality level of unadjusted earnings in 
1988, 7.1% in 1995, and 5.0% in 2002. With regard to the inequality change over time, RPD 
contributed to the inequality increase between 1988 and 1995 (accounting for 17.4% of the 
increase in the Gini coefficient), while it contributed to a reduction in inequality between 1995 
and 2002 (-7.8%) 
Table 4 presents the result of inequality decomposition for both RPD-adjusted and 
unadjusted earnings. It is clear from Table 4 that the relative importance of the province on the 
earnings inequality becomes much smaller for RPD-adjusted earnings than for unadjusted 
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earnings. For example, the province accounted for 8.3% of unadjusted earnings inequality in 
1988, 17.1% in 1995, and 8.6% in 2002, while it only accounted for 2.1% of RPD-adjusted 
earnings in 1988, 9.4% in 1995, and 4.1% in 2002.10 Due to the decline of the province effect, 
the relative contribution of other factors becomes larger for RPD-adjusted earnings.  
This occurs because the RPD adjustment resulted in a decrease in the level of 
inter-provincial inequality in all three periods. If we calculate the coefficient of variation (CV) 
of the unadjusted and RPD-adjusted mean earnings of ten provinces, CV is much smaller in 
RPD-adjusted earnings.11 The CV of mean RPD-adjusted earnings of ten provinces ( RPDCV ) is 
0.072, 56% smaller than that of unadjusted earnings (0.163, noRPDCV ) in 1988. Similarly, 
RPDCV  is 0.227, 33% smaller than noRPDCV  (0.338) in 1995, and 0.170, 40% smaller than 
noRPDCV  (0.282) in 2002. Since inter-provincial inequality decreased, and thus the absolute 
contribution of the province to the overall inequality decreased, the relative contribution of other 
factors increased. 
The above results are fairly consistent with the result of Démurger, Fournier, and Li 
(2006), except that this analysis shows that RPD contributed to a reduction in inter-provincial 
inequality from 1995 to 2002 while Démurger et al. found that RPD contributed to a slight 
increase in inter-provincial inequality.12 This may be due to the differences in income definition 
between the two analyses. While this analysis is based on individual earnings, the analysis of 
Démurger et al. (2006) is based on household disposable income, which includes more income 
                                                  
10 If we set “total explained” as 100%, where [total explained = 100% - residual contribution] as in the 
subsequent decomposition analysis, the province accounted for 19.0% of unadjusted earnings inequality 
in 1988, 41.4% in 1995, and 23.2% in 2002, while it accounted for only 5.3% of RPD-adjusted earnings 
in 1988, 26.4% in 1995, and 12.2% in 2002. 
11 The coefficient of variation (CV) is the standard deviation divided by the mean. CV is useful since it is 
scale independent, unlike variance and standard deviation. In fact, CV is also Lorenz-consistent. 
12 Using the CHIP data from 1988, 1995, and 2002, Démurger et al. (2006) have already discussed the 
extent to which RPD inflated the overall income inequality in urban China measured in terms of 
household total disposable income. They found that overall inequality in urban China from 1988 to 2002 
was 7-20% higher for the RPD-unadjusted income compared to that in the RPD-adjusted income. By 
applying the standard inequality decomposition by sub-groups, they also showed that the use of 
RPD-unadjusted income overstated the contribution of inter-provincial inequality to overall inequality 
levels and inequality changes between 1988 and 1995, while it did not influence the contribution of 
inter-provincial inequality between 1995 and 2002. 
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components than the current analysis. Similar to Démurger et al. (2006), the above result 
suggests that in the existing literature, the level of earnings inequality in urban China, and the 
contribution of the province to it, have been overstated. In addition, the contributions of other 
factors were understated (except for the inequality increase from 1995 to 2002) in the inequality 
decomposition literature. Showing the degree to which RPD adjustment changes the entire 
decomposition result or the relative importance of the province and other various factors is the 
contribution to the existing literature of this analysis.13  
Since it seems more appropriate to measure the “real” earnings inequality in terms of 
worker purchasing power, the RPD-adjusted earnings are examined and decomposed in the 
following analysis. 
 
4.3 Decomposing RPD-adjusted earnings inequality into institutional and human capital 
factors 
4.3.1 Decomposing earnings inequality level 
Table 5 reports the decomposition result of the earnings inequality level without the 
residual. In contrast to Table 4, in Table 5, the contribution of each factor is calculated by setting 
“total explained” as 100%, where total explained = R-squared = 100% - residual contribution. It 
should be kept in mind that the total percentages explained by the explanatory variables are not 
so large, and that in all three years the residual was the largest factor, and its contribution 
increased gradually (60.3%, 64.4%, 66.0%) in each of the years indicated. Residual contribution 
can be calculated by [100% - total explained] in Table 5 or seen from the “residual” line in Table 
4. The regression result for each year is presented in the Appendix.  
As can be seen from Table 5, the relative magnitude of the contributions of some factors 
changed substantially over the three periods. In both 1988 and 1995, the largest contributor 
                                                  
13 The inequality decomposition by sub-groups used in Démurger et al. (2006) does not make it possible 
to examine the degree to which the relative importance of the province compared to changes in other 
factors (e.g. education, occupation, employment status) due to the RPD adjustment, while the 
regression-based decomposition used in this analysis does. 
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(excluding residual) to the earnings inequality level was experience (64.8% in 1988 and 35.5% 
in 1995), while, in 2002, it was employment status (27.6%), and the contribution of experience 
became much smaller (10.1%).?The contributions of employment status, education, occupation, 
and industry, to the earnings inequality level increased continuously from 1988 to 1995 and 
from 1995 to 2002 (education: 5.1%, 8.6%, 16.9%; occupation: 5.6%, 7.7%, 12.3%; industry: 
-0.8%, 3.7%, 7.9%, respectively). By contrast, the contributions of experience, sex, and 
Communist Party (CP) membership decreased?between 1988 and 1995 and between 1995 and 
2002 (experience: 64.8%, 35.5%, 10.1%, sex: 5.5%, 4.7%, 4.9%, CP membership: 4.2%, 3.6%, 
2.1%). The contribution of the province remained relatively large, especially for 1995 and 2002, 
even though RPD was adjusted?(26.4% in 1995 and 12.2% in 2002).?Ownership consistently 
accounted for about 6 to 8 percent of the inequality level. Minority status contributed essentially 
nothing in all three periods.  
 
4.3.2 Decomposing earnings inequality increase 
Table 6 presents the decomposition results of the earnings inequality increase from 1988 
to 1995 and from 1995 to 2002. In a similar manner to the construction of Table 5, the 
contribution of each factor is calculated by setting “total explained” as 100%, where total 
explained = 100% - residual contribution. Again, it should be noted that the total percentages 
explained by the explanatory variables are not large, and that in both periods the residual was 
the largest factor, although its contribution decreased. The residual contribution to the earnings 
inequality increase was about 70-90 % for 1988-1995, and about 70-80% for 1995-2002. (The 
magnitude depends on which inequality measure is used, and the residual contribution can be 
calculated by [100% - total explained] in Table 6). 
In a similar manner to the level decomposition, the relative importance of some factors 
changed significantly between the two periods. The main contributors to inequality increase 
from 1988 to 1995 were the province (322.6% measured by the Gini coefficient), industry 
(66.0%), education (56.8%), occupation (37.1%), and ownership (24.7%), while the main 
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contributors to inequality decrease were experience (-374.8%) and employment status (-25.2%). 
From 1995 to 2002, the major disequalizing forces were employment status (219.3%), education 
(78.8%), occupation (47.1%), and industry (38.9%), and their contributions increased compared 
to those from 1988 to 1995. The contribution of sex also increased from -5.2% to 6.2%. From 
1995 to 2002, the main equalizers were experience (-178.9%) and the province (-93.7%). 
Although the province contributed significantly to the inequality change in urban China during 
both periods, the direction of its contribution was reversed. In fact, as examined in the next 
section, inter-provincial inequality fell between 1995 and 2002 despite the overall urban 
inequality increase during that period. Ownership also contributed slightly to the equalization of 
earnings from 1995 to 2002 (-7.4%). CP membership contributed to a slight reduction in the 
inequality in both periods (-5.5% and -8.9%). Minority status disequalized the earnings 
distribution slightly (3.6%) from 1988 to 1995, while equalizing it slightly (-1.5%) from 1995 to 
2002. The direction or sign of the contribution of each factor to earnings inequality is fairly 
consistent in all inequality measures. However, some inequality measures, such as log-variance, 
show an opposite direction to the Gini coefficient with regard to the contribution of CP 
membership and sex from 1988 to 1995 and ownership from 1995 to 2002. 
 
4.4 Decomposing earnings inequality increase into price and quantity effects 
In Table 7, the decomposition result of the inequality increase measured by log-variance 
is further decomposed into price and quantity effects. Table 7 clearly shows that a large part of 
the explained inequality increase was due to a price (coefficient) change in both periods and its 
contribution even increased from 76.9% in the period 1988-1995 to 94.4% in the period 
1995-2002. Within the contribution of each factor, price effect is also generally much larger than 
quantity effect, which represents the change in the distribution of worker attributes. However, 
regarding the contribution of education, the quantity effect is much larger (71.2%) than the price 
effect (28.8%) between 1988 and 1995, suggesting that the compositional changes in worker 
educational level contributed to the inequality increase more than the changes in educational 
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earnings differentials did.14 By contrast, between 1995 and 2002, the changes in educational 
earnings differential (price effect) contributed greatly to the inequality increase (107.6% of the 
contribution of education), while the compositional changes of worker educational level 
(quantity effect) worked as an equalizer (-7.6% of the contribution of education).  
 
5. Discussion: Underlying Labor-related Institutional Reform in China 
5.1 Comparison with the existing literature 
The relative importance of each factor to the earnings inequality in urban China in 1988 
and 1995, obtained from the above decomposition results, is generally consistent with the 
results of Knight and Song (2005) and Okushima and Uchimura (2006). They also decomposed 
the earnings inequality in urban China by examining the CHIP 1988 and 1995 data. However, it 
is difficult to compare the results of this study with their results due to different 
specifications.1516 
The major differences between the results of this study and these other studies are as 
follows: First, Knight and Song (2005), Okushima and Uchimura (2006), and Knight and Song 
(2008) did not include employment status as a decomposer. By including employment status, it 
                                                  
14 However, the price effect of education between 1988 and 1995 is likely to be understated in my 
analysis, where the returns to education in 1988 are much larger than those in the literature, such as 
Knight and Song (2005) and Okushima and Uchimura (2006). This seems to be due to the treatment of 
missing income components in my analysis and the fewer educational categories.  
15 Knight and Song (2005) did not include industry and employment status as decomposers and used age 
instead of estimated experience. Their result shows that the two most important factors in the inequality 
level in 1988 and 1995 were age and province, although the contribution of age decreased while the 
contribution of the province increased. As a result, age became the largest equalizing force and the 
province became the largest disequalizing force for the inequality increase from 1988 to 1995 (Residuals 
excluded). The contribution of education and occupation increased from 1988 to 1995, and thus education 
and occupation became the second and the third largest contributors, respectively, to the inequality 
increase from 1988 to 1995. Discrimination variables such as sex, CP membership, and minority status 
only made slight contributions to the inequality increase. 
16 Okushima and Uchimura (2006) did not include minority status, employment status, and province in 
the decomposition of overall urban inequality. (Instead of including province as a decomposer, they 
presented the inequality decomposition result by province separately.) They also used age instead of 
experience. The contribution of age, education, and occupation showed trends similar to the results of 
Knight and Song (2005) and my own. Unlike the results found in my own work and the work by Knight 
and Song (2005), they found a greater contribution of sex to earnings inequality in 1995 and thus in the 
inequality increase from 1988 to 1995. 
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became possible to present a new and significant change in the decomposition result, i.e., the 
large contribution of employment status to inequality in 2002 and its increase from 1995 to 
2002. Second, in my results, the contribution of the province is much smaller due to the RPD 
adjustment. As a result, the relative contributions of other factors are greater. Third, the 
estimated coefficients for education in 1988 are higher in my sample than in the results of the 
studies mentioned, and as a result, the contribution of education in 1988 is greater in my sample. 
However, on this point, it is possible that the returns to education in 1988 in my estimation are 
overstated due to the treatment of missing income components in my analysis and the smaller 
number of education categories. Fourth, the magnitude of the contribution of each factor to the 
inequality increase is much larger in my result. 
Similar to previous studies, especially Knight and Song (2005), my decomposition 
results indicate that institutional factors, in particular labor market segmentation by employment 
status, province, industry, and ownership, and human capital factors (educational level, 
experience, and occupation) contributed significantly to the levels of and changes in earnings 
inequality in urban China from 1988 to 2002. However, the magnitude of the contributions of 
some factors changed substantially from 1988 to 2002, reflecting institutional changes which 
occurred in urban China during that period.  
 
5.2 Labor-related institutional reform in China17  
China’s employment system began its transition from a planned system to a market 
system at the end of the 1970s. Under the planned system, wages were set by the government, 
jobs were assigned to graduates, and life-time employment was guaranteed in state-owned 
working units, which were the dominant employer. There was no labor “market.” However, 
labor-related institutional reform began at the end of the 1970s, when China started to introduce 
market mechanisms. This reform introduced market mechanisms into the wage and employment 
                                                  
17 For the details of labor-related institutional reform in China, I have mainly referred to Marukawa 
(2002) and Chapter 2 of Knight and Song (2005).  
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system in urban China. The Chinese labor “market” appears to be functioning better, especially 
since the mid-1990s, due to the 1994 Labor Law and the increase in worker lay-offs. Wages and 
labor mobility became more flexible and the wages seem to reflect true worker ability more 
appropriately. Along with the market-oriented economic reforms, employment status and 
ownership were also diversified and created earnings gaps. At the same time, incomplete and 
uneven marketization created a new labor market segmentation by province, industry, 
employment status, and ownership. Below, the results for inequality decomposition and the 
underlying institutional reform are analyzed in greater detail.   
 
5.2.1 Introduction of market mechanisms 
Under China’s economic reforms, wage and labor mobility became more flexible and 
forms of employment more diversified. First, the Chinese government reformed the rigid wage 
system towards one that was more flexible and more linked to productivity. In the 1980s, the use 
of bonuses was expanded, the pay for performance mechanism was partly introduced in the 
early 1990s, and the linkage between salary and a firm’s performance increased (Marukawa, 
2002). The decomposition results in the previous section reflect this wage system change. It 
shows that the earnings premium for skills and abilities represented by education and 
occupation increased continuously from 1988 to 2002.  
Education: The contribution of education to earnings inequality increased over time, 
and education became the second largest factor in 2002, accounting for 16.9% of the explained 
inequality level. Although a large part of the contribution of education is explained by the 
quantity effect (i.e. an increased proportion of highly educated workers) between 1988 and 1995, 
for the inequality increase between 1995 and 2002, 107.6% of the contribution due to education 
was explained by price change. In other words, increased earnings differentials among 
education groups contributed significantly to the inequality increase from 1995 to 2002, as seen 
from the regression result in the Appendix. For example, in 1995, annual earnings for the 
educational level “lower middle school” (edu4) and “elementary school and below” (edu5) were 
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lower by about 23% and 39%, respectively, compared to “college or above” (edu1). However, in 
2002, these were lower by 46% and 53%, respectively.  
Occupation: The contribution of occupation also increased over time, and occupation 
was the third largest contributor in 2002, accounting for 12.3% of the explained inequality level. 
Price effects were also dominant in both 1988 to 1995 and 1995 to 2002, indicating increased 
earnings differentials between different occupations. For example, in 2002, “owner and manager 
of private or individual enterprise, and self-employed” (occ1) had reduced relative earnings 
compared to “office worker” (occ4) by 48%, while occ1 increased relative earnings 0.1% in 
1988 and 7% in 1995, although these were not statistically significant. This seems to be due to 
the increase in self-employed workers and their low earnings (In 2002, it became possible to 
separate occ1 into “owner and manager of private firms,” and “self-employed workers.” 82% of 
occ1 is self-employed workers and the mean RPD-adjusted earnings is 2,135 yuan for 
self-employed workers, while it is 5,759 yuan for private firm owners and managers).  
Experience: As Appleton, Song, and Xia (2005) suggest, under the planned economy, 
earnings were once strongly linked with “experience” in terms of age or tenure in a firm and 
such “experience” did not necessarily indicate a worker’s ability. Thus the decline in the 
experience premium can be seen as a tendency to give higher rewards for worker ability and 
performance.  
Increasing returns to ability can be interpreted in two ways. The first interpretation is 
that, with the gradual marketization, the Chinese labor “market” has just recently gained the 
ability to evaluate the true ability of workers appropriately. During the planned economy era, 
high ability was undervalued while low ability was overvalued, as illustrated by seniority-based 
pay. The second interpretation is that, with the advent of a more flexible labor market, rapid 
economic development, and educational reform, which generated a more highly educated 
population, supply and demand shifts for skills influenced the earnings differentials among skill 
groups.18 On this count, Asuyama (2008) examines the causes of widening earnings gaps 
                                                  
18 Educational reform generated a more educated population. In 1998, the Chinese Ministry of Education 
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among education groups in more detail by introducing supply and demand shift effects. 
Second, in addition to wage reform, the employment system was reformed to promote 
more labor mobility and the forms of employment became more diversified. Under China’s 
economic reforms, life-time employment was no longer guaranteed. In the early 1980s, the labor 
contract system, which allowed employers to conclude a fixed-term contract with new recruits, 
was introduced experimentally. It was expanded for all newly hired state-owned-enterprise 
(SOE) workers in the mid-1980s (Marukawa, 2002; Knight & Song 2005). Finally, the 1994 
Labor Law required the conclusion of a labor contract (either unfixed [permanent] or fixed-term 
contract) with all workers regardless of the firm’s ownership. The deterioration in the SOEs’ 
performance and the increased lay-off of workers in the late 1990s also contributed to ending 
China’s life-time employment system (Marukawa, 2002).  
Employment status: The decomposition result in the previous section clearly shows the 
end of life-time employment and the diversification of employment statuses, especially after the 
enforcement of the 1994 Labor Law. Employment status diversified from 1995 to 2002 in 
particular and accompanied the appearance of large earnings differentials between different 
employment statuses. As a result, employment status became the largest contributor to earnings 
inequality in 2002, accounting for 27.6% of the total explained inequality, although it 
contributed little in 1998 and in 1995 (3.6% and 1.7%, respectively). Consequently, it was the 
largest contributor to the inequality increase between 1995 and 2002, accounting for 67.2% of 
the log-variance increase. 17.1% of that contribution was due to the quantity effect and 82.9% 
was due to the price effect. As described in Section 2, between 1995 and 2002, the proportion of 
permanent and long-term contract workers (emp1) declined significantly (from 96.5% to 76.9%), 
and instead, the proportion of temporary and short-term contract workers (emp2), private 
enterprise proprietor or self-employed workers (emp3), and other workers including workers 
                                                                                                                                                  
promulgated The Action Plan to Vitalize Education Facing the Twenty-first Century which aims to expand 
the gross enrollment rate in higher education institutions to 11% by 2000 and 15% by 2010 (Pretorius & 
Xue, 2003). As a result, the number of graduates from regular institutions of higher education rapidly 
increased from 830,000 in 1998 to 3 million in 2005 (China Statistical Yearbook 2006). 
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employed without contract (emp4) increased (emp2: 2.5% to 11.2%, emp3: 0.3% to 3.1%, 
emp4: 0.7% to 8.8%). As seen from the regression results in the Appendix, the earnings 
differentials among these workers also increased. Estimated coefficients obtained from the 
regression indicate that emp2, emp3, and emp4 statuses saw earnings decrease by 30%, 70%, 
and 47%, respectively compared to emp1 in 2002, while these were only 13%, 3%, and 26% in 
1995 (Note that coefficient for emp3 (3%) was not statistically significant). 
Ownership: In addition to the diversification of employment status, firm ownership 
types also diversified. In the private sector, which expanded during the reforms, wages became 
more closely linked with worker productivity (Appleton, Song, & Xia, 2005). As described in 
Section 2, the proportion of state-owned and local publicly-owned units (own1) and urban 
collectives (own2) declined significantly from 1988 to 2002, while the proportion of private or 
individual enterprises and self-employed persons (own2) increased significantly, and that of 
Sino-foreign joint ventures (own4) and foreign-owned firms (own5) increased slightly. The 
regression results indicate that there were large earnings differentials between these different 
types of ownerships.  
 
5.2.2 Segmentation of labor market 
Since the marketization of the Chinese labor system was accompanied by a rapid and 
uneven industrialization, and the gradual marketization was incomplete and uneven, the Chinese 
urban labor market became segmented by province, industry, employment status, and 
ownership.   
Province: First, the Chinese urban labor market is segmented by province. Although 
after the RPD adjustment, the contribution of the province to the inequality increased from 5.3% 
in 1988 to 26.4% in 1995, and substantially accounted for the inequality increase between 1988 
and 1995 (322.6% as measured by the Gini coefficient). Due to the fall in inter-provincial 
inequality, the contribution of the province decreased in the period 1995 to 2002 and thus the 
province worked as an equalizing force from 1995 to 2002. However, the province still 
 26
remained one of the important disequalizing forces in 2002, accounting for 12.2% of the 
inequality level. Within the province effect, Shanxi, Gansu, and Guangdong especially 
contributed to the inequality increase from 1988 to 1995. For example, out of the total 322.6% 
contribution of the province to the increase in the Gini coefficient, Shanxi, Gansu, and 
Guangdong accounted for 105.0%, 77.4%, and 58.1% respectively. For the province’s negative 
contribution of -93.7% to the inequality increase from 1995 to 2002, Guangdong still 
contributed to the earnings inequality increase (12.3%). However, Shanxi, Gansu, and Henan 
contributed to a reduction in inequality (-34.3%, -31.3%, and -26.5% respectively).  
What caused this labor market segmentation by province? First, as in any other country, 
it is natural for labor mobility to be limited to the local region due to family ties, familiarity with 
the working environment and the local market, and so on. In addition, in urban China, some 
local city governments previously gave incentives to firms to hire workers from inside the city 
or directly restrict the hiring of workers from outside the city in certain occupations (Marukawa, 
2002). It is well known that the urban registration (hukou) system created labor market 
segmentation between urban and rural workers, but labor mobility was also restricted even 
among urban hukou residents by these protectionist policies of local governments.  
Second, the differences in labor demand across provinces, which also depend on 
economic growth and the speed of industrialization in each province, may have enlarged the real 
earnings differentials between provinces. For example, in Guangdong which achieved high 
economic growth by attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), RPD-adjusted earnings 
increased faster than in other provinces, and thus contributed to the inequality increase. By 
contrast, however, Shanxi and Gansu are relatively poor inland provinces and have received a 
very small amount of FDI. In fact, Wan, Lu, and Chen (2007) and Zhang and Zhang (2003) 
found that globalization, represented by trade and FDI, was the most important contributor to 
the rise of regional inequality in China by examining 1987-2001 and 1986-1991 data, 
respectively, and that its contribution increased during those periods. However, since inland 
provinces such as Shanxi, Gansu, and Henan continued to receive relatively small amounts of 
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FDI after 1995 compared with coastal provinces, such an explanation cannot explain the fall in 
inter-provincial inequality between 1995 and 2002.  
The inter-provincial inequality (inequality between provinces) increased from 1988 to 
1995 but decreased from 1995 to 2002 in urban China, while intra-provincial inequality 
(inequality within provinces) continuously increased by a larger magnitude from 1995 to 2002. 
As mentioned earlier, the coefficient of variation (CV) of the mean earnings of 10 provinces 
increased significantly from 0.072 in 1988 to 0.227 in 1995, but then declined to 0.170 in 2002. 
The relative earnings inequality between coastal and inland regions also fell in the period 1995 
to 2002. This is shown by the fact that mean earnings grew faster in the inland region than in the 
coastal region in the period 1995 to 2002 (In 2002, mean earnings became 1.75 times larger than 
those in 1995 in the inland region, while becoming 1.60 times larger in the coastal region).19 
Intra-provincial inequality, represented by the Gini coefficient and log-variance, is presented in 
Table 8. It shows that in almost all provinces, inequality increased in both periods, 1988 to 1995 
and 1995 to 2002, accelerating during the latter period. 
By examining the per capita disposable urban household income computed from the 
CHIP 1995 and 2002 data, Khan and Riskin (2005) also found a decline in inter-provincial 
inequality and an increase in intra-provincial inequality in urban China from 1995 to 2002. The 
fall in inter-provincial inequality was also confirmed by the official Chinese statistics. Figure 4 
presents the coefficient of variation (CV) of urban household per capita annual disposable 
income for the 10 provinces and for all 31 provinces, adjusted for RPD. The CV is computed 
based on the official Chinese statistics. The 10 provinces are the same as those used in my 
analysis and the 31 provinces include all provinces in urban China. Although the CV in 2002 
appears to be notably smaller than in neighboring years, we can still see that the overall trend is 
for inter-provincial inequality to increase from the 1980s up to around 1995, and then decrease 
or remain almost the same since then. Although further research is needed, one possible 
                                                  
19 Following Kanbur and Zhang (2005) and other previous studies, Beijing, Liaoning, Jiangsu, and 
Guangdong are classified as coastal region provinces and the remaining provinces, Shanxi, Anhui, Henan, 
Hubei, Yunnan, and Gansu are classified as inland region provinces. 
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explanation for the decline in inter-provincial inequality in urban China from 1995 to 2002 is 
that increased supply of migrant workers to the coastal provinces such as Beijing, Guangdong 
and Jiangsu suppressed the earnings of local low-skilled urban workers. Such a phenomenon 
would consequently cause the rise in mean earnings of those provinces to be relatively moderate. 
This hypothesis is also examined in Asuyama (2008). 
Industry: The contribution of industry to inequality increased over time. Under rapid 
economic development, the proportion of manufacturing decreased and the service sector 
increased in urban China, as examined in Section 2. Such a rapid change may have increased the 
labor demand in some service sectors and decreased the labor demand in the manufacturing 
sector (the product demand shift across industries will be estimated in Asuyama (2008) and this 
speculation partly confirmed, especially from 1995 to 2002). The regression results in the 
Appendix show a remarkable structural change in earnings differentials by industry. In 1988, 
workers in many service industries received smaller earnings than those in manufacturing. 
However, in 2002, workers in many service industries received much higher earnings than those 
in manufacturing. Since it takes some time to acquire the new skills required for a new industry 
and to change jobs from old to new industries, a rapid industrial shift creates labor market 
segmentation by industry.  
Employment status: As examined before, a segmented labor market by employment 
status also emerged. Labor market dualism between permanent or long-term contract workers 
who enjoy higher wages and job security, and temporary or short-term contract workers who 
receive lower wages and little job security, have also been seen in many other countries. (For 
OECD countries, see OECD, 2002.) 
Ownership: Segmentation by ownership also seems to exist in urban China. Knight and 
Song (2005) show that the proportion of workers who moved from SOE jobs to other ownership 
types (16%) was much smaller than those who moved to another SOE (84%) in 1999.  
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6. Conclusions 
6.1 Summary of the findings 
This paper analyzed the causes of earnings inequality in urban China from 1988 to 
2002. Individual samples from 1988, 1995, and 2002 of urban Chinese residents, drawn from 
the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) were used. My analysis contributes to the 
existing inequality decomposition literature on urban China by 1) measuring the earnings 
inequality in terms of the purchasing power of workers by adjusting for regional price 
differences (RPD), 2) detecting how the causes of earnings inequality changed from the 
1988-1995 period to the 1995-2002 period by examining recent trends (2002), and 3) 
decomposing the earnings inequality increase further into price and quantity effects.  
Earnings inequality in urban China continuously increased, even if adjusted for 
regional price differences (RPD). I have argued that earnings inequality should be measured in 
terms of a worker’s purchasing power and reflect the cost of living in each region. By adjusting 
for RPD, I have showed that in the existing literature, the level of earnings inequality in urban 
China and the contribution of the province to it have been overstated, while the contribution of 
other factors were understated. 
The earnings inequality decomposition result reveals how the causes of earnings 
inequality in urban China changed between the two periods 1988-1995 and 1995-2002 by 
primarily reflecting the labor-related institutional reforms. Individual ability, represented by 
education attainment and occupation, received greater rewards as China introduced market 
mechanisms into its urban labor system. The Chinese labor “market” seems to be functioning 
better, especially after the mid 1990s, due to the 1994 Labor Law and an increase in worker 
lay-offs. Employment status (permanent or temporary worker, etc.) and ownership were 
diversified and created earnings gaps. In particular, employment status became the largest 
disequalizing force between 1995 and 2002 (except residual). At the same time, incomplete and 
uneven marketization created labor market segmentations by province, industry, employment 
status, and ownership. It also should be noted that province, which had been the largest 
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disequalizer between 1988 and 1995 became the second largest equalizer between 1995 and 
2002, reflecting the decline in inter-provincial inequality. 
For both the periods 1988-1995 and 1995-2002, a large part of the explained inequality 
increase was due to price change (changes in the valuation of each individual attributes) and not 
due to quantity change (changes in the distribution of worker attributes). The contribution of 
price change even increased from 76.9% in the period 1988 to 1995 to 94.4% in the period 1995 
to 2002 in terms of the change in log-variance. 
 
6.2 Areas for future research 
Although this paper aims to examine the causes of earnings inequality in urban China 
in detail, there exist some limitations in this research. First, it should be noted that the largest 
factor is the residual, which is an unexplained contributor to earnings inequality, accounting for 
about 60-70% of the level of and increase in earnings inequality in urban China between 1988 
and 2002. A large contribution of the residual can be also observed in the case of earnings 
inequality in the US, even after controlling for observable human capital (Katz & Autor, 1999; 
Juhn, Murphy, & Pierce, 1993). Such a large residual contribution may include factors such as 
unobserved abilities of individuals, omitted variables such as the size and profitability of a firm, 
and errors in earnings data.20  
Second, it is necessary to examine to what degree the supply and demand shift 
contributed to earnings inequality increase in urban China. In the US, where numerous studies 
have been carried out on the causes of earnings inequality increase, the effects of supply and 
demand shift across human capital groups were examined in addition to the institutional factors 
such as minimum wage and unionization rate.21 In the US, the relative demand increase for 
highly educated workers, due to the product demand shift through increased imports from 
                                                  
20 Knight and Li (2005) found a positive association between wage and firm profitability by analyzing 
the data from China’s urban household surveys in 1995 and 1999. 
21 For a literature review on the causes of the earnings inequality increase in the US, see Katz and Autor 
(1999). 
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developing countries and skill-biased technological change, is considered to be one of the 
important causes of the rising earnings inequality. As discussed in Section 5, one possible 
explanation for a widening earnings gap between education groups is the relative demand 
increase for highly educated workers, as seen in the US. Also, supply and demand shift may 
have contributed to the changes in inter-provincial and intra-provincial inequality. However, 
there are almost no studies which estimate the degree to which supply and demand factors have 
contributed to earnings inequality in urban China.22 In Asuyama (2008), I examine the supply 
and demand shift effects on earnings inequality increase in urban China. 
Third, my sample largely excludes rural-urban migrants working in urban areas. The 
numbers of migrant workers having rural registration (hukou) continuously increased under China’s 
economic reforms and rapid industrialization. According to a report by the State Council of China, 
the number of rural migrants working in urban and coastal areas was 118 million in 2004 (?务??
??课题组, 2006). A large number of migrant workers not only directly changes the earnings 
distribution in urban China, but also indirectly changes it through influencing the labor supply and 
demand of workers with urban hukou.  
Fourth, since my decomposition results are only for three discrete years (1988, 1995, and 
2002), there might exist a year-specific effect. Examining more years, as well as examining the 
longitudinal data, is more desirable. 
Lastly, it will also be interesting to see how the causes of earnings inequality in urban 
China have changed after 2002, and to see how they will change in the future, although we will 
need to wait for new releases of data in order to do this. Since around 2004, a shortage of 
low-skilled workers and a rise in their wages in the South China coastal region has been 
reported. This may have contributed to a reduction in the earnings gap among highly skilled and 
low-skilled workers. In addition, China's new labor contract law, which came into effect in 2008, 
may make the Chinese labor market less flexible. It is thought that the new law will make it 
                                                  
22 One exception is Liu, Park, and Zhao (2007) which examined the supply and demand shift effects 
across education groups, although it is an “incomplete and preliminary” paper.  
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harder for employers to dismiss employees by imposing restrictions on the termination of a 
contract and requiring heavy severance pay. It also restricts the use of temporary workers (Khan 
& Barboza, June 30, 2007; Cooney, Biddulph, Zhu, & Li, 2007). Such new institutional reforms 
in China may bring about further changes in earnings inequality and its causes in urban China. 
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Figure 1. Real per capita annual disposable income and its inequality (90/10 ratio) in 
urban households: Lowest 10% and Highest 10% income groups 
Figure 2. Lorenz curve of unadjusted earnings  
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Figure 3. Lorenz curve of RPD-adjusted earnings 
 
Figure 4. Coefficient of variation (CV) of urban household per capita annual disposable 
income in 10 and 31 provinces  
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
1988 1995 2002 1988 1995 2002 1988 1995 2002 1988 1995 2002
Total 17,085 9,477 8,077 100.0 100.0 100.0 1,457 2,761 4,651 1,350 2,465 4,160
0 Male 8,963 5,044 4,549 52.5  53.2   56.3  1,580 2,991 5,074 1,465 2,672 4,547
1 Female 8,122 4,433 3,528 47.5  46.8   43.7  1,321 2,499 4,105 1,223 2,229 3,661
0 Not minority 16,460 9,037 7,709 96.3  95.4   95.4  1,458 2,776 4,649 1,349 2,475 4,152
1 Minority 625 440 368 3.7    4.6     4.6    1,422 2,450 4,691 1,373 2,262 4,347
0 Not Communist Party member 12,970 7,064 5,589 75.9  74.5   69.2  1,357 2,543 4,150 1,254 2,273 3,713
1 Communist Party member 4,115 2,413 2,488 24.1  25.5   30.8  1,770 3,399 5,776 1,650 3,025 5,165
1 College or above 1,076 746 882 6.3    7.9     10.9  1,847 3,553 6,855 1,718 3,176 6,121
2 Professional school 1,167 1,504 1,941 6.8    15.9   24.0  1,550 3,165 5,366 1,455 2,810 4,816
3 Middle level professional, technical orvocational school, and upper middle school 6,190 3,969 3,326 36.2    41.9    41.2    1,409 2,689 4,350 1,298 2,403 3,870
4 Lower middle school 6,604 2,806 1,752 38.7  29.6   21.7  1,407 2,509 3,477 1,312 2,250 3,136
5 Elementary school and below 2,048 452 176 12.0  4.8     2.2    1,504 2,307 3,091 1,374 2,020 2,792
1 Owner and manager of private or individualenterprise, and self-employed 109 68 142 0.6      0.7      1.8      1,450 3,052 2,857 1,354 2,724 2,508
2 Professional or technical worker 2,743 2,092 1,798 16.1  22.1   22.3  1,628 3,177 5,692 1,526 2,849 5,111
3
Head of institution or enterprise, division
head in institution or enterprise, and
factory director or manager
1128 1141 951 6.6      12.0    11.8    1,861 3,506 6,448 1,726 3,123 5,772
4 Office worker 4,060 2,025 1,704 23.8  21.4   21.1  1,523 2,726 4,815 1,405 2,414 4,279
5 Laborer and other (including salesclerk orservice worker in 2002) 9,045 4,151 3,482 52.9    43.8    43.1    1,325 2,359 3,615 1,225 2,110 3,239
1 State-owned, at central or provincial level,and local publicly-owned 13,522 7,822 5,381 79.1    82.5    66.6    1,509 2,854 5,065 1,404 2,559 4,563
2 Urban collective 3,436 1,457 603 20.1  15.4   7.5    1,237 2,159 3,108 1,132 1,909 2,816
3 Private or individual enterprise, and self-employed 16 34 769 0.1      0.4      9.5      1,176 3,001 3,066 1,042 2,382 2,705
4 Sino-foreign joint venture 55 111 142 0.3    1.2     1.8    2,595 3,573 5,851 1,931 2,910 4,963
5 Foreign-owned 7 11 51 0.0    0.1     0.6    1,759 7,638 6,466 1,278 5,983 5,350
6 Other 49 42 1131 0.3    0.4     14.0  1,214 2,666 4,346 1,024 2,165 3,797
RPD-adjusted Beijing priceUrban price
N Share (%)
Mean of earnings (1988 yuan price)
sex
min
cp
edu
own
occ
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1988 1995 2002 1988 1995 2002 1988 1995 2002 1988 1995 2002
1 Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry,fishing, and water conservancy 169 168 100 1.0      1.8      1.2      1,412 3,012 4,621 1,338 2,726 4,286
2 Manufacturing 7,387 3,894 2,038 43.2  41.1   25.2  1,412 2,558 3,987 1,319 2,293 3,577
3 Mining and geological survey andprospecting 694 78 211 4.1      0.8      2.6      1,426 2,718 4,173 1,376 2,508 3,930
4 Construction 585 253 261 3.4    2.7     3.2    1,489 2,942 4,838 1,389 2,587 4,175
5 Transportation, communications, postsand telecommunications 1,157 497 676 6.8      5.2      8.4      1,606 3,061 4,989 1,449 2,712 4,470
6
Commerce and trade, restaurants and
catering, materials supply, marketing, and
warehousing
2,418 1,364 822 14.2    14.4    10.2    1,482 2,486 3,508 1,318 2,213 3,055
7 Real estate, public utilities, personal andconsulting services, social services 393 367 1148 2.3      3.9      14.2    1,335 2,841 4,150 1,220 2,434 3,667
8 Health, physical culture and social welfare 799 459 444 4.7    4.8     5.5    1,474 3,088 5,638 1,373 2,727 5,142
9 Education, culture, and arts 1,265 718 775 7.4    7.6     9.6    1,528 3,115 5,860 1,440 2,786 5,308
10 Scientific research and technical services 359 238 164 2.1    2.5     2.0    1,606 3,205 6,842 1,523 2,916 5,815
11 Finance and insurance 269 197 229 1.6    2.1     2.8    1,346 3,155 5,404 1,259 2,838 4,806
12 Government and Party organs, socialorganizations 1,486 1,177 1,027 8.7      12.4    12.7    1,492 3,009 5,519 1,389 2,694 5,006
13 Other 104 67 182 0.6    0.7     2.3    1,202 3,098 4,079 1,120 2,745 3,470
1 Permanent (including long-term contract)worker 16,779 9,142 6,215 98.2    96.5    76.9    1,466 2,777 5,065 1,359 2,484 4,567
2 Temporary (including short-term contract)worker 267 239 903 1.6      2.5      11.2    910 2,157 3,745 787 1,774 3,144
3 Private enterprise proprietor and self-employed 27 25 247 0.2      0.3      3.1      1,139 3,046 2,673 985 2,448 2,370
4 Other 12 71 712 0.1    0.7     8.8    1,634 2,683 2,871 1,370 2,298 2,523
1 Beijing 837 726 794 4.9    7.7     9.8    1,471 3,784 6,207 1,471 3,256 4,656
2 Shanxi 1,820 1,053 720 10.7  11.1   8.9    1,310 2,127 3,891 1,222 1,939 3,479
3 Liaoning 1,831 1,162 1,031 10.7  12.3   12.8  1,387 2,459 4,079 1,334 2,278 3,823
4 Jiangsu 2,244 1,189 910 13.1  12.5   11.3  1,380 2,973 4,808 1,313 2,656 4,357
5 Anhui 1,632 780 627 9.6    8.2     7.8    1,371 2,172 3,860 1,402 2,160 3,866
6 Henan 1,982 913 856 11.6  9.6     10.6  1,239 2,064 3,518 1,215 2,144 3,827
7 Hubei 1,883 1,109 950 11.0  11.7   11.8  1,364 2,585 3,942 1,317 2,273 3,578
8 Guangdong 2,010 912 848 11.8  9.6     10.5  2,087 4,954 7,604 1,468 3,612 5,793
9 Yunnan 1,731 1,045 810 10.1  11.0   10.0  1,518 2,529 4,483 1,485 2,451 4,413
10 Gansu 1,115 588 531 6.5    6.2     6.6    1,392 2,006 3,762 1,362 1,919 3,595
Notes: Base categories (omitted variables in regression analyses) are highlighted. N: Number of observations.
             sex: sex, min: minority status, cp: Communist Party membership, edu: educational level, occ: occupation, own: ownership, ind: industry, 
             emp: employment status, and prov: province.
RPD-adjusted Beijing priceUrban price
N Share (%)
Mean of earnings (1988 yuan price)
ind
emp
prov
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Table 2. Inequality indices of unadjusted and RPD-adjusted earnings  
 
Table 3. Contribution of RPD (regional price differences) to the inequality of unadjusted 
earnings  
 
Table 4. Inequality decomposition of RPD-adjusted and unadjusted earnings (Gini 
coefficient)  
1988 1995 2002 88-95 95-02 1988 1995 2002 88-95 95-02
N 17,085 9,477 8,077 - - 17,085 9,477 8,077 - -
mean 1,457 2,761 4,651 1,304 1,890 1,350 2,465 4,160 1,115 1,696
Gini 0.245 0.300 0.348 0.055 0.048 0.233 0.278 0.330 0.046 0.052
Theil entropy 0.116 0.156 0.208 0.041 0.051 0.103 0.132 0.185 0.029 0.053
90/10 2.904 4.072 5.328 1.168 1.256 2.843 3.749 5.011 0.905 1.262
50/10 1.804 2.174 2.555 0.370 0.381 1.807 2.123 2.505 0.317 0.382
90/50 1.610 1.873 2.086 0.263 0.213 1.574 1.766 2.000 0.192 0.235
75/25 1.668 1.969 2.344 0.300 0.375 1.664 1.909 2.290 0.245 0.381
95/5 4.316 6.937 10.145 2.621 3.208 4.113 6.271 9.436 2.158 3.165
log-variance 0.208 0.373 0.616 0.165 0.243 0.195 0.341 0.589 0.146 0.248
Notes: All indices are based on unadjusted or RPD-adjusted yuan earnings.
          N: number of observations, Gini: Gini coefficient, 90/10: Ratio of 90th to 10th percentile
          (50/10, 90/50, 75/25, 95/5 are similarly defined). 
Unadjusted RPD-adjusted
(Unit: %)
1988 1995 2002 88-95 95-02
Gini 4.78 7.11 5.03 17.44 -7.82
Theil entropy 10.91 15.39 10.96 28.16 -2.51
90/10 2.07 7.94 5.95 22.51 -0.46
50/10 -0.15 2.33 1.94 14.44 -0.33
90/50 2.22 5.74 4.10 27.23 -10.33
75/25 0.26 3.03 2.28 18.44 -1.65
95/5 4.70 9.60 6.99 17.66 1.35
log-variance 6.19 8.72 4.49 11.89 -2.00
Note: For the computation procedure, see Section 3.2.
(Unit: % except Gini)
1988 1995 2002 88-95 95-02 1988 1995 2002 88-95 95-02
sex 2.16 1.69 1.67 -0.75 1.60 2.02 1.55 1.57 -0.55 1.75
min -0.01 0.08 0.01 0.52 -0.37 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.50 -0.59
cp 1.68 1.27 0.71 -0.80 -2.28 1.54 1.17 0.68 -0.46 -2.35
exp 25.75 12.66 3.42 -54.32 -45.91 24.26 11.74 3.35 -43.74 -48.72
edu 2.04 3.05 5.76 8.23 20.22 1.84 2.77 5.53 6.91 22.64
occ 2.21 2.72 4.20 5.37 12.09 2.06 2.48 4.03 4.34 13.61
own 2.67 2.82 2.07 3.58 -1.90 2.56 2.68 2.09 3.17 -1.54
ind -0.31 1.31 2.67 9.57 9.98 -0.29 1.17 2.53 7.65 10.95
emp 1.43 0.60 9.38 -3.66 56.29 1.20 0.49 8.65 -2.65 59.25
prov 2.12 9.42 4.14 46.76 -24.04 8.27 17.08 8.57 56.13 -44.22
residual 60.26 64.39 65.96 85.51 74.33 56.53 58.77 63.00 68.70 89.21
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Gini 0.233 0.278 0.330 0.046 0.052 0.245 0.300 0.348 0.055 0.048
Notes: Total (=100%) includes residual contribution, which is excluded in Tables 6, 7, and 8.
           Inequality increase decomposition is based on the Gini coefficient.
           For the notation of each factor, refer to Table 1.
RPD-adjusted Unadjusted
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Table 5. Inequality level decomposition of RPD-adjusted earnings 
 
Table 6. Inequality increase decomposition of RPD-adjusted earnings  
(Unit: %)
1988 1995 2002
sex 5.45 4.74 4.91
min -0.02 0.22 0.02
cp 4.22 3.57 2.09
exp 64.80 35.54 10.06
edu 5.13 8.57 16.91
occ 5.55 7.65 12.34
own 6.71 7.91 6.08
ind -0.77 3.67 7.86
emp 3.61 1.69 27.55
prov 5.32 26.44 12.17
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Total explained 39.74 35.61 34.04
Note: The contribution of each factor is calculated by setting "Total explained" 
           as 100%,  where Total explained = R-squared = 100% - residual contribution.
           The dependent variable is RPD-adjusted log earnings.
(Unit: % except index)
1988-1995 Gini Theilentropy 90/10 50/10 90/50 75/25 95/5
log-
variance
sex -5.20 0.00 0.83 -8.61 -130.50 -20.53 2.80 3.49
min 3.59 1.83 1.54 4.74 46.02 8.78 0.88 0.65
cp -5.54 -0.78 -0.01 -8.66 -120.41 -19.59 1.80 2.42
exp -374.78 -160.20 -125.76 -515.33 -5,547.43 -1,007.43 -44.33 -16.13
edu 56.76 31.56 27.51 73.27 664.29 131.06 17.95 14.64
occ 37.08 21.69 19.22 47.17 408.12 82.46 13.38 11.36
own 24.70 15.92 14.51 30.46 236.46 50.60 11.18 10.02
ind 66.02 33.41 28.18 87.37 851.96 162.14 15.81 11.53
emp -25.24 -11.16 -8.90 -34.47 -364.71 -66.76 -3.56 -1.70
prov 322.61 167.73 142.87 424.06 4,056.19 779.25 84.09 63.75
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Total explained 14.49 21.01 22.64 12.05 1.71 7.57 27.74 30.09
Index 0.046 0.029 0.905 0.317 0.192 0.245 2.158 0.146
1995-2002 Gini Theilentropy 90/10 50/10 90/50 75/25 95/5
log-
variance
sex 6.22 5.44 5.55 6.29 7.03 6.11 5.32 5.18
min -1.45 -0.57 -0.69 -1.53 -2.38 -1.33 -0.43 -0.28
cp -8.88 -2.30 -3.23 -9.47 -15.73 -7.97 -1.28 -0.18
exp -178.87 -65.54 -81.64 -189.10 -296.79 -163.29 -48.07 -29.01
edu 78.79 41.67 46.95 82.14 117.41 73.69 35.95 29.71
occ 47.11 26.25 29.21 48.99 68.80 44.24 23.04 19.53
own -7.42 0.68 -0.47 -8.15 -15.85 -6.30 1.93 3.29
ind 38.87 20.27 22.91 40.55 58.22 36.31 17.40 14.27
emp 219.31 104.28 120.63 229.70 338.99 203.50 86.55 67.21
prov -93.68 -30.18 -39.21 -99.41 -159.73 -84.95 -20.40 -9.72
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Total explained 25.67 30.11 29.39 25.33 22.25 26.20 30.94 31.89
Index 0.052 0.053 1.262 0.382 0.235 0.381 3.165 0.248
Notes: The contribution of each factor is calculated by setting "Total explained" as 100%, where
           Total explained = 100% - residual contribution. The dependent variable is RPD-adjusted log earnings.
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Table 7. Decomposition of inequality increase into price and quantity effects (log-variance) 
 
Table 8. Intra-provincial (within-province) inequality 
 
 
1988 1995 2002 1988 1995 2002
1 Beijing 0.223 0.234 0.338 0.181 0.252 0.635
2 Shanxi 0.264 0.276 0.329 0.235 0.397 1.065
3 Liaoning 0.192 0.260 0.323 0.126 0.309 0.510
4 Jiangsu 0.201 0.257 0.345 0.164 0.290 0.505
5 Anhui 0.254 0.253 0.312 0.221 0.288 0.507
6 Henan 0.222 0.278 0.301 0.188 0.353 0.465
7 Hubei 0.192 0.243 0.287 0.132 0.249 0.448
8 Guangdong 0.290 0.305 0.360 0.273 0.374 0.615
9 Yunnan 0.201 0.210 0.261 0.145 0.237 0.435
10 Gansu 0.255 0.248 0.327 0.258 0.305 0.584
0.231 0.283 0.352 0.189 0.337 0.579
0.233 0.255 0.303 0.198 0.315 0.586
0.233 0.278 0.330 0.195 0.341 0.589
Notes: Highlighted provinces (Beijing, Liaoning, Jiangsu, and Guangdong) are 
          classified as coastal and the remaining provinces are classified as inland.
Log-variance
Coastal
Inland
Total 10 provinces
Gini coefficient
(Unit: % except index)
Price
effect
Quantity
effect
Price
effect
Quantity
effect
Price
effect
Quantity
effect
Price
effect
Quantity
effect
(Sj) (P1) (Q1) (P2) (Q2) (Sj) (P1) (Q1) (P2) (Q2)
sex 3.49 2.77 0.71 79.58 20.42 5.18 5.84 -0.65 112.63 -12.63
min 0.65 0.61 0.04 93.90 6.10 -0.28 -0.33 0.05 116.57 -16.57
cp 2.42 2.10 0.32 86.83 13.17 -0.18 -0.08 -0.10 44.81 55.19
exp -16.13 -17.51 1.38 108.55 -8.55 -29.01 -25.17 -3.84 86.75 13.25
edu 14.64 4.21 10.42 28.79 71.21 29.71 31.97 -2.26 107.60 -7.60
occ 11.36 9.47 1.88 83.40 16.60 19.53 21.10 -1.57 108.06 -8.06
own 10.02 10.74 -0.72 107.14 -7.14 3.29 3.46 -0.17 105.05 -5.05
ind 11.53 9.90 1.62 85.91 14.09 14.27 11.36 2.91 79.64 20.36
emp -1.70 -6.07 4.37 356.27 -256.27 67.21 55.70 11.51 82.87 17.13
prov 63.75 60.67 3.08 95.17 4.83 -9.72 -9.48 -0.24 97.55 2.45
Total 100.00 76.89 23.11 76.89 23.11 100.00 94.37 5.63 94.37 5.63
Total explained 30.09 31.89
Index 0.146 0.248
Notes: The contribution of each factor (Sj) is calculated by setting "Total explained" as 100%, 
          where Total explained = 100% - residual contribution.
          The sum of  (P1) and (Q1) for each factor is equal to (Sj).
         (P2) and (Q2) are calculated by setting the contribution of each factor (Sj) = 100%
          The dependent variable is RPD-adjusted log earnings.
of which within each factor
88-95 95-02
of which within each factor
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Appendix: OLS regression result and decomposition-related figures by year  
1988 Coef. t cor sd sj (%)
lnY 1.000 0.442 100
sex -0.092 -15.85 *** -0.209 0.499 2.16
min -0.015 -1.12 0.012 0.188 -0.01
cp 0.058 8.43 *** 0.298 0.428 1.68
exp 0.046 47.63 *** 0.452 11.069 52.02
expsq -0.001 -30.87 *** 0.367 493.413 -26.27
edu2 -0.022 -1.7 * 0.059 0.252 -0.08
edu3 -0.158 -14.13 *** -0.072 0.481 1.23
edu4 -0.236 -19.14 *** -0.049 0.487 1.26
edu5 -0.312 -19.53 *** 0.017 0.325 -0.38
occ1 0.001 0.03 0.002 0.080 0.00
occ2 0.020 2.39 ** 0.149 0.367 0.24
occ3 0.048 4.57 *** 0.177 0.248 0.48
occ5 -0.051 -6.69 *** -0.256 0.499 1.49
own2 -0.133 -17.32 *** -0.207 0.401 2.50
own3 -0.099 -0.64 -0.027 0.031 0.02
own4 0.355 5.05 *** 0.030 0.057 0.14
own5 -0.003 -0.01 -0.006 0.020 0.00
own6 -0.017 -0.24 -0.042 0.053 0.01
ind1 -0.041 -1.72 * 0.005 0.099 0.00
ind3 0.034 2.37 ** 0.007 0.197 0.01
ind4 0.024 1.66 * 0.016 0.182 0.02
ind5 0.019 1.66 * 0.045 0.251 0.05
ind6 -0.013 -1.42 -0.038 0.349 0.04
ind7 -0.088 -4.37 *** -0.040 0.150 0.12
ind8 -0.067 -5.97 *** 0.023 0.211 -0.07
ind9 -0.091 -8.63 *** 0.055 0.262 -0.30
ind10 -0.038 -2 ** 0.044 0.143 -0.05
ind11 -0.084 -3.78 *** -0.017 0.124 0.04
ind12 -0.131 -13.36 *** 0.031 0.282 -0.26
ind13 -0.176 -4.06 *** -0.035 0.078 0.11
emp2 -0.294 -8.79 *** -0.168 0.124 1.38
emp3 -0.151 -1.37 -0.037 0.040 0.05
emp4 0.065 0.37 -0.003 0.026 0.00
prov2 -0.201 -13.69 *** -0.099 0.309 1.39
prov3 -0.062 -4.59 *** 0.018 0.309 -0.08
prov4 -0.059 -4.41 *** -0.004 0.338 0.02
prov5 -0.035 -2.33 ** 0.012 0.294 -0.03
prov6 -0.162 -11.74 *** -0.078 0.320 0.92
prov7 -0.110 -8.06 *** 0.004 0.313 -0.03
prov8 -0.037 -2.34 ** 0.032 0.322 -0.09
prov9 -0.005 -0.35 0.091 0.302 -0.03
prov10 -0.100 -6.05 *** -0.008 0.247 0.05
constant 6.897 349.91 ***
N 17085
F value 228.24
R-squared 0.397
Notes: The dependent variable is RPD-adjusted log earnings (lnY). Coef., t, cor, sd, and sj (%)
represent estimated coefficient, t-statistics, correlation between each variable and lnY, standard
deviation of each variable, and the contribution of each factor to the inequality level of lnY,
respectively. For the definitions of explanatory variables, see Table 1. edu1, occ4, own1, ind2,
emp1, prov1 are the omitted categories. Statistical significance is based on robust standard
errors corrected for heteroscedasticity. *** denotes statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and *
at 10% level.
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1995 Coef. t cor sd sj (%)
lnY 1.000 0.584 100
sex -0.110 -10.66 *** -0.179 0.499 1.69
min -0.073 -2.96 *** -0.030 0.210 0.08
cp 0.066 5.6 *** 0.258 0.436 1.27
exp 0.049 20.46 *** 0.371 9.578 29.66
expsq -0.001 -14.05 *** 0.327 387.087 -17.00
edu2 -0.088 -4.88 *** 0.125 0.365 -0.68
edu3 -0.158 -9.03 *** -0.032 0.493 0.43
edu4 -0.232 -11 *** -0.110 0.457 2.00
edu5 -0.387 -11.56 *** -0.093 0.213 1.31
occ1 0.071 1.26 0.013 0.084 0.01
occ2 0.088 5.91 *** 0.175 0.415 1.10
occ3 0.062 3.75 *** 0.184 0.325 0.63
occ5 -0.044 -2.96 *** -0.260 0.496 0.98
own2 -0.195 -12.41 *** -0.206 0.361 2.49
own3 -0.029 -0.21 -0.013 0.060 0.00
own4 0.241 4.43 *** 0.026 0.108 0.11
own5 0.808 3.84 *** 0.046 0.034 0.21
own6 0.018 0.22 -0.022 0.066 0.00
ind1 0.006 0.15 0.018 0.132 0.00
ind3 0.065 1.12 0.006 0.090 0.01
ind4 0.035 1.21 0.007 0.161 0.01
ind5 0.094 3.83 *** 0.035 0.223 0.12
ind6 -0.034 -2.05 ** -0.087 0.351 0.18
ind7 -0.044 -1.45 -0.041 0.193 0.06
ind8 0.069 3.16 *** 0.049 0.215 0.12
ind9 0.061 3.61 *** 0.084 0.265 0.23
ind10 0.093 3.75 *** 0.064 0.156 0.16
ind11 0.267 7.31 *** 0.036 0.143 0.23
ind12 0.040 2.49 ** 0.077 0.330 0.17
ind13 -0.077 -0.85 -0.008 0.084 0.01
emp2 -0.132 -3.2 *** -0.113 0.157 0.40
emp3 -0.027 -0.18 -0.007 0.051 0.00
emp4 -0.256 -3.04 *** -0.053 0.086 0.20
prov2 -0.450 -18.91 *** -0.151 0.314 3.65
prov3 -0.309 -13.98 *** -0.040 0.328 0.69
prov4 -0.104 -4.84 *** 0.063 0.331 -0.37
prov5 -0.298 -12.85 *** -0.054 0.275 0.76
prov6 -0.346 -14.69 *** -0.079 0.295 1.37
prov7 -0.324 -15.19 *** -0.027 0.321 0.48
prov8 0.128 5.04 *** 0.201 0.295 1.30
prov9 -0.217 -9.88 *** 0.030 0.313 -0.35
prov10 -0.452 -18.3 *** -0.100 0.241 1.87
constant 7.532 216.29 ***
N 9477
F value 106.17
R-squared 0.356
Note: See the 1988 result.
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2002 Coef. t cor sd sj (%)
lnY 1.000 0.767
sex -0.165 -11.09 *** -0.157 0.496 1.67
min 0.036 1.02 0.008 0.209 0.01
cp 0.050 3.01 *** 0.234 0.462 0.71
exp 0.038 11.73 *** 0.195 9.623 9.25
expsq -0.001 -8.49 *** 0.169 391.452 -5.82
edu2 -0.135 -5.14 *** 0.149 0.427 -1.12
edu3 -0.286 -10.18 *** -0.058 0.492 1.07
edu4 -0.456 -13.7 *** -0.204 0.412 4.98
edu5 -0.525 -9.33 *** -0.083 0.146 0.82
occ1 -0.483 -3.67 *** -0.197 0.131 1.63
occ2 0.060 2.83 *** 0.180 0.416 0.59
occ3 0.085 3.56 *** 0.193 0.322 0.69
occ5 -0.076 -3.63 *** -0.266 0.495 1.30
own2 -0.230 -8.03 *** -0.135 0.263 1.06
own3 -0.066 -1.8 * -0.261 0.294 0.66
own4 0.290 5.64 *** 0.038 0.131 0.19
own5 0.382 5.28 *** 0.033 0.079 0.13
own6 -0.013 -0.58 -0.054 0.347 0.03
ind1 0.056 0.9 0.016 0.111 0.01
ind3 0.113 2.91 *** 0.005 0.160 0.01
ind4 0.043 1.15 0.007 0.177 0.01
ind5 0.142 4.77 *** 0.031 0.277 0.16
ind6 -0.052 -1.73 * -0.179 0.302 0.37
ind7 0.059 2.42 ** -0.091 0.349 -0.25
ind8 0.222 7.01 *** 0.084 0.228 0.55
ind9 0.184 6.7 *** 0.125 0.295 0.89
ind10 0.213 3.62 *** 0.068 0.141 0.27
ind11 0.137 3.17 *** 0.033 0.166 0.10
ind12 0.110 4.33 *** 0.127 0.333 0.61
ind13 0.054 1.06 -0.041 0.148 -0.04
emp2 -0.302 -10.71 *** -0.146 0.315 1.81
emp3 -0.695 -7.78 *** -0.242 0.172 3.77
emp4 -0.472 -14.93 *** -0.218 0.284 3.80
prov2 -0.427 -9.64 *** -0.107 0.285 1.70
prov3 -0.003 -0.08 -0.033 0.334 0.00
prov4 0.016 0.51 0.024 0.316 0.02
prov5 -0.133 -4.01 *** -0.017 0.268 0.08
prov6 -0.114 -3.7 *** -0.019 0.308 0.08
prov7 -0.203 -6.59 *** -0.046 0.322 0.39
prov8 0.294 8.55 *** 0.136 0.307 1.60
prov9 -0.015 -0.48 0.058 0.300 -0.03
prov10 -0.192 -5.48 *** -0.050 0.248 0.31
constant 8.120 166.76 ***
N 8077
F value 89.45
R-squared 0.340
Note: See the 1988 result.  
